Cache-Timing Attacks and Shared Contexts

Billy Bob Brumley; Nicola Tuveri

doi:10.5281/zenodo.10464747

Abstract

Cache-timing attacks recover algorithm state by exploiting the fact that the latency of retrieving data from memory is essentially governed by the availability of said data in the processor’s cache. Efficient and effective countermeasures to these attacks are needed. A shared memory context is a mechanism for reusing dynamically allocated memory. Focusing on public key cryptography within OpenSSL and its implementation of shared contexts, this paper examines the ability of a shared context to aid in mitigation of cache-timing attacks. The results are pessimistic towards this approach.

Original language	English
Pages	233-242
Number of pages	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10464747
Publication status	Published - Feb 2011
Externally published	Yes
Publication type	Not Eligible
Event	COSADE 2011: Second International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - Darmstadt, Germany Duration: 24 Feb 2011 → 25 Feb 2011 Conference number: 2 http://cosade2011.cased.de/index.html

Workshop

Workshop	COSADE 2011
Abbreviated title	COSADE 2011
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Darmstadt
Period	24/02/11 → 25/02/11
Internet address	http://cosade2011.cased.de/index.html

Keywords

cache-timing attacks
side-channel attacks
countermeasures
memory allocation

Access to Document

10.5281/zenodo.10464747Licence: CC BY

https://web.archive.org/web/20170809094030/http://cosade2011.cased.de/files/2011/cosade2011_talk22_paper.pdfLicence: Unspecified

Cite this

@conference{b53755a6630947efbce8439747b2a11c,

title = "Cache-Timing Attacks and Shared Contexts",

abstract = "Cache-timing attacks recover algorithm state by exploiting the fact that the latency of retrieving data from memory is essentially governed by the availability of said data in the processor{\textquoteright}s cache. Efficient and effective countermeasures to these attacks are needed. A shared memory context is a mechanism for reusing dynamically allocated memory. Focusing on public key cryptography within OpenSSL and its implementation of shared contexts, this paper examines the ability of a shared context to aid in mitigation of cache-timing attacks. The results are pessimistic towards this approach.",

keywords = "cache-timing attacks, side-channel attacks, countermeasures, memory allocation",

author = "Brumley, {Billy Bob} and Nicola Tuveri",

year = "2011",

month = feb,

doi = "10.5281/zenodo.10464747",

language = "English",

pages = "233--242",

note = "COSADE 2011 : Second International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, COSADE 2011 ; Conference date: 24-02-2011 Through 25-02-2011",

url = "http://cosade2011.cased.de/index.html",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - Cache-Timing Attacks and Shared Contexts

AU - Brumley, Billy Bob

AU - Tuveri, Nicola

N1 - Conference code: 2

PY - 2011/2

Y1 - 2011/2

N2 - Cache-timing attacks recover algorithm state by exploiting the fact that the latency of retrieving data from memory is essentially governed by the availability of said data in the processor’s cache. Efficient and effective countermeasures to these attacks are needed. A shared memory context is a mechanism for reusing dynamically allocated memory. Focusing on public key cryptography within OpenSSL and its implementation of shared contexts, this paper examines the ability of a shared context to aid in mitigation of cache-timing attacks. The results are pessimistic towards this approach.

AB - Cache-timing attacks recover algorithm state by exploiting the fact that the latency of retrieving data from memory is essentially governed by the availability of said data in the processor’s cache. Efficient and effective countermeasures to these attacks are needed. A shared memory context is a mechanism for reusing dynamically allocated memory. Focusing on public key cryptography within OpenSSL and its implementation of shared contexts, this paper examines the ability of a shared context to aid in mitigation of cache-timing attacks. The results are pessimistic towards this approach.

KW - cache-timing attacks

KW - side-channel attacks

KW - countermeasures

KW - memory allocation

U2 - 10.5281/zenodo.10464747

DO - 10.5281/zenodo.10464747

M3 - Abstract

SP - 233

EP - 242

T2 - COSADE 2011

Y2 - 24 February 2011 through 25 February 2011

ER -