Certified Side Channels

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and what runtime decisions they make. We uncover a combination of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, in extreme cases inducing completely disjoint multi-precision arithmetic stacks deep within the cryptosystem level for keys that otherwise seem logically equivalent. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, we design and implement key recovery attacks utilizing signals ranging from electromagnetic (EM) emanations, to granular microarchitecture cache timings, to coarse traditional wall clock timings.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication29th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2020
Pages2021-2038
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Publication typeA4 Article in a conference publication
EventUSENIX Security Symposium -
Duration: 12 Aug 202014 Aug 2020

Conference

ConferenceUSENIX Security Symposium
Period12/08/2014/08/20

Publication forum classification

  • Publication forum level 1

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