Certified Side Channels

Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Bob Brumley

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and what runtime decisions they make. We uncover a combination of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, in extreme cases inducing completely disjoint multi-precision arithmetic stacks deep within the cryptosystem level for keys that otherwise seem logically equivalent. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, we design and implement key recovery attacks utilizing signals ranging from electromagnetic (EM) emanations, to granular microarchitecture cache timings, to coarse traditional wall clock timings.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication29th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2020
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Publication typeA4 Article in conference proceedings
EventUSENIX Security Symposium -
Duration: 12 Aug 202014 Aug 2020


ConferenceUSENIX Security Symposium

Publication forum classification

  • Publication forum level 1


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