TY - GEN
T1 - Déjà Vu
T2 - ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
AU - Hassan, Sohaib Ul
AU - Gridin, Iaroslav
AU - Delgado-Lozano, Ignacio M.
AU - García, Cesar Pereida
AU - Chi-Domínguez, Jesús Javier
AU - Aldaya, Alejandro Cabrera
AU - Brumley, Billy Bob
N1 - Funding Information:
The first author was supported in part by the Tuula and Yrjö Neuvo Fund through the Industrial Research Fund at Tampere University of Technology.
Funding Information:
This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 804476).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Owner/Author.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
jufoid=50069
PY - 2020/10/30
Y1 - 2020/10/30
N2 - Recent work on Side Channel Analysis (SCA) targets old, well-known vulnerabilities, even previously exploited, reported, and patched in high-profile cryptography libraries. Nevertheless, researchers continue to find and exploit the same vulnerabilities in old and new products, highlighting a big issue among vendors: effectively tracking and fixing security vulnerabilities when disclosure is not done directly to them. In this work, we present another instance of this issue by performing the first library-wide SCA security evaluation of Mozilla's NSS security library. We use a combination of two independently-developed SCA security frameworks to identify and test security vulnerabilities. Our evaluation uncovers several new vulnerabilities in NSS affecting DSA, ECDSA, and RSA cryptosystems. We exploit said vulnerabilities and implement key recovery attacks using signals - -extracted through different techniques such as timing, microarchitecture, and EM - -and improved lattice methods.
AB - Recent work on Side Channel Analysis (SCA) targets old, well-known vulnerabilities, even previously exploited, reported, and patched in high-profile cryptography libraries. Nevertheless, researchers continue to find and exploit the same vulnerabilities in old and new products, highlighting a big issue among vendors: effectively tracking and fixing security vulnerabilities when disclosure is not done directly to them. In this work, we present another instance of this issue by performing the first library-wide SCA security evaluation of Mozilla's NSS security library. We use a combination of two independently-developed SCA security frameworks to identify and test security vulnerabilities. Our evaluation uncovers several new vulnerabilities in NSS affecting DSA, ECDSA, and RSA cryptosystems. We exploit said vulnerabilities and implement key recovery attacks using signals - -extracted through different techniques such as timing, microarchitecture, and EM - -and improved lattice methods.
KW - applied cryptography
KW - CVE-2020-12399
KW - CVE-2020-12401
KW - CVE-2020-12402
KW - CVE-2020-6829
KW - DSA
KW - ECDSA
KW - lattice-based cryptanalysis
KW - NSS
KW - public key cryptography
KW - RSA
KW - side-channel analysis
KW - software security
U2 - 10.1145/3372297.3421761
DO - 10.1145/3372297.3421761
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85096157246
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 1887
EP - 1902
BT - CCS 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - ACM
Y2 - 9 November 2020 through 13 November 2020
ER -