On the Alleged Incompatibility Between Wittgenstein and Kripke

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1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter aims to show that the alleged incompatibility of the views of Wittgenstein and Kripke is sometimes more specious than real. It is suggested that there are, underneath the surface, interesting points of contact between these two philosophers. Kripke’s views on names and reference are arguably not vulnerable to Wittgenstein’s critique of “the Augustinian Picture of Language” and of ostensive definitions. The attitudes of these two philosophers towards theories in philosophy are not as dissimilar as many have quickly judged either. Certain “Wittgensteinian” critiques of Kripke and popular interpretations of Kripke which exaggerate his commitment to extreme natural kind essentialism are critically assessed. The nature of Kripke’s disputed idea on necessary a posteriori is clarified. It is suggested that perhaps Wittgenstein was not as unequivocally a semantic internalist as some of his ardent followers have insisted.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEngaging Kripke with Wittgenstein
Subtitle of host publicationThe Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond
EditorsMartin Gustafsson, Oskari Kuusela, Jakub Mácha
PublisherRoutledge
Pages9-27
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9781000970630
ISBN (Print)9781032139975
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2023
Publication typeA3 Book chapter

Publication series

NameRoutledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy

Publication forum classification

  • Publication forum level 3

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Arts and Humanities

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