Why do MPs run to become MEPs when most simply want to remain MPs? On servicing the personal vote and doing party service

This paper proceeds from the observation that, when viewed in comparative perspective the incidence of MPs seeking to become MEPs is highest in open-list (intraparty preference) voting systems and that in these systems votes will represent both a personal resource for MEP-candidates and an electoral resource for political parties. Finland is presented as a case of optimal list-system openness and all 124 MPs standing in the seven European Parliament (EP) elections between 1996 and 2024 are analysed by party (magnitude) and length of incumbency. Contrasting hypotheses are posited, relating to the incentive for MPs to use EP elections to cultivate a personal vote—possibly to further personal goals on the ‘domestic front’—or to run principally at the behest of the party. A surprising finding is that most MEP-seeking MPs are first-term MPs. Overall, whilst there are exceptions, most Finnish MPs running for Brussels neither want, nor expect to become MEPs; they are doing party service rather than servicing their personal vote.