Certified Side Channels

Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Bob Brumley

Tutkimustuotos: KonferenssiartikkeliScientificvertaisarvioitu

1 Sitaatiot (Scopus)

Abstrakti

We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and what runtime decisions they make. We uncover a combination of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, in extreme cases inducing completely disjoint multi-precision arithmetic stacks deep within the cryptosystem level for keys that otherwise seem logically equivalent. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, we design and implement key recovery attacks utilizing signals ranging from electromagnetic (EM) emanations, to granular microarchitecture cache timings, to coarse traditional wall clock timings.
AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
Otsikko29th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2020
Sivut2021-2038
Sivumäärä18
TilaJulkaistu - 2020
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA4 Artikkeli konferenssijulkaisussa
TapahtumaUSENIX Security Symposium -
Kesto: 12 elok. 202014 elok. 2020

Conference

ConferenceUSENIX Security Symposium
Ajanjakso12/08/2014/08/20

Julkaisufoorumi-taso

  • Jufo-taso 1

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