TY - GEN
T1 - Cryptographic Role-Based Access Control, Reconsidered
AU - Liu, Bin
AU - Michalas, Antonis
AU - Warinschi, Bogdan
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was partially funded by the HARPOCRATES project, Horizon Europe and the Technology Innovation Institute (TII), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, for the project ARROWSMITH: Living (Securely) on the edge. Due to the page limit, we leave out the preliminaries, some details of the results and the proofs of the theorems. A full version of this paper can be found on https://eprint. iacr.org/2022/1268.pdf.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - In this paper, we follow the line of existing study on cryptographic enforcement of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). Inspired by the study of the relation between the existing security definitions for such system, we identify two different types of attacks which cannot be captured by the existing ones. Therefore, we propose two new security definitions towards the goal of appropriately modelling cryptographic enforcement of Role-Based Access Control policies and study the relation between our new definitions and the existing ones. In addition, we show that the cost of supporting dynamic policy update is inherently expensive by presenting two lower bounds for such systems which guarantee correctness and secure access.
AB - In this paper, we follow the line of existing study on cryptographic enforcement of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). Inspired by the study of the relation between the existing security definitions for such system, we identify two different types of attacks which cannot be captured by the existing ones. Therefore, we propose two new security definitions towards the goal of appropriately modelling cryptographic enforcement of Role-Based Access Control policies and study the relation between our new definitions and the existing ones. In addition, we show that the cost of supporting dynamic policy update is inherently expensive by presenting two lower bounds for such systems which guarantee correctness and secure access.
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-20917-8_19
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-20917-8_19
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85142696280
SN - 9783031209161
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 282
EP - 289
BT - Provable and Practical Security - 16th International Conference, ProvSec 2022, Proceedings
A2 - Ge, Chunpeng
A2 - Guo, Fuchun
PB - Springer
T2 - International Conference on Provable Security
Y2 - 11 November 2022 through 12 November 2022
ER -