Individual Differences in Argument Strength Discrimination

Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Hietanen, Jonathan Baron

Tutkimustuotos: ArtikkeliScientificvertaisarvioitu

5 Lataukset (Pure)

Abstrakti

Being able to discriminate poorly justified from well justified arguments is necessary for informed citizenship. However, it is not known whether the ability to recognize argument strength generalizes across different types of arguments, and what cognitive factors predict this ability or these abilities. Drawing on the theory of argument schemes, we examined arguments from consequence, analogy, symptoms, and authority in order to cover all major types of arguments. A study (N = 278) on the general population in Finland indicated that the ability to discriminate between strong and weak arguments did not differ between these schemes. Argument strength discrimination ability correlated positively with analytic thinking dispositions promoting both quality and quantity of thinking, slightly positively with education, and negatively with overconfidence. It was unrelated to an intuitive thinking style, and to self-rated mental effort.

AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
Sivut141-167
JulkaisuARGUMENTATION
Vuosikerta38
Varhainen verkossa julkaisun päivämäärä7 syysk. 2023
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - 2024
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä

Julkaisufoorumi-taso

  • Jufo-taso 2

!!ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Linguistics and Language

Sormenjälki

Sukella tutkimusaiheisiin 'Individual Differences in Argument Strength Discrimination'. Ne muodostavat yhdessä ainutlaatuisen sormenjäljen.

Siteeraa tätä