Social wrongs

Arto Laitinen; Arvi Särkelä

doi:10.1080/13698230.2020.1853435

Social wrongs

Arto Laitinen, Arvi Särkelä

Historia, filosofia ja kirjallisuustiede

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli › Tieteellinen › vertaisarvioitu

4 Sitaatiot (Scopus)

12 Lataukset (Pure)

Abstrakti

In this paper we elucidate the notion of ‘social wrongs’. It differs from moral wrongness, and is broader than narrowly political wrongs. We distinguish conceptually monadic wrongness (1.1), dyadic wronging (1.2), and the idea of there being something ‘wrong with’ an entity (1.3). We argue that social and political wrongs share a feature with natural badness or wrongness (illnesses of organisms) as well as malfunctioning artifacts or dysfunctional organizations: they violate so called ought-to-be norms; they are not as they ought to be; there is something wrong with them. In contrast, moral wrongs are violations of ought-to-do norms. Social wrongs typically, but not invariably, include dyadic wronging. We examine who or what can wrong whom or what, and by what means: we can be wronged by individuals and groups, as well as by practices, institutions or structures (2.1–2.3). The notion of structural injustice is compared to the notion of social wrongs in 2.4. Social wrongs are defined as there being something wrong with the social reality (3.3), in comparison to there being something wrong with an organism or a system (3.1), including the narrowly political wrongs of systems of governance (3.2).

Alkuperäiskieli	Englanti
Sivut	1048-1072
Sivumäärä	25
Julkaisu	CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Vuosikerta	26
Numero	7
Varhainen verkossa julkaisun päivämäärä	25 marrask. 2020
DOI - pysyväislinkit	https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2020.1853435
Tila	Julkaistu - 2023
OKM-julkaisutyyppi	A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä

Rahoitus

We would like to thank Amy Allen, Matteo Bianchin, Åsa Burman, Federica Gregoratto, Säde Hormio, Katharine Jenkins, Joonas Pennanen, Corrado Piroddi, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments. We would also like to thank participants at the SPT conference, Brighton, “Critical Theory and The Concept of Social Pathology”, 13-14.9.2017; at the Social Ontology 2018 conference at Tufts, August 22-25, 2018, and at the Power & Governance conference at University of Tampere, 27-29 August 2018. This article is part of the Swiss National Science Foundation funded research project “A Diagnosis of Social Pathologies? Variations of Naturalism in Social Philosophy” (project 100012_172992).

Julkaisufoorumi-taso

Jufo-taso 2

!!ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy
Sociology and Political Science

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10.1080/13698230.2020.1853435Lisenssi: CC BY-NC-ND

Social wrongsFinal published version, 737 KBLisenssi: CC BY-NC-ND

https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:tuni-202111038133Lisenssi: CC BY-NC-ND

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title = "Social wrongs",

abstract = "In this paper we elucidate the notion of {\textquoteleft}social wrongs{\textquoteright}. It differs from moral wrongness, and is broader than narrowly political wrongs. We distinguish conceptually monadic wrongness (1.1), dyadic wronging (1.2), and the idea of there being something {\textquoteleft}wrong with{\textquoteright} an entity (1.3). We argue that social and political wrongs share a feature with natural badness or wrongness (illnesses of organisms) as well as malfunctioning artifacts or dysfunctional organizations: they violate so called ought-to-be norms; they are not as they ought to be; there is something wrong with them. In contrast, moral wrongs are violations of ought-to-do norms. Social wrongs typically, but not invariably, include dyadic wronging. We examine who or what can wrong whom or what, and by what means: we can be wronged by individuals and groups, as well as by practices, institutions or structures (2.1–2.3). The notion of structural injustice is compared to the notion of social wrongs in 2.4. Social wrongs are defined as there being something wrong with the social reality (3.3), in comparison to there being something wrong with an organism or a system (3.1), including the narrowly political wrongs of systems of governance (3.2).",

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author = "Arto Laitinen and Arvi S{\"a}rkel{\"a}",

note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank Amy Allen, Matteo Bianchin, {\AA}sa Burman, Federica Gregoratto, S{\"a}de Hormio, Katharine Jenkins, Joonas Pennanen, Corrado Piroddi, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments. We would also like to thank participants at the SPT conference, Brighton, “Critical Theory and The Concept of Social Pathology”, 13-14.9.2017; at the Social Ontology 2018 conference at Tufts, August 22-25, 2018, and at the Power & Governance conference at University of Tampere, 27-29 August 2018. This article is part of the Swiss National Science Foundation funded research project “A Diagnosis of Social Pathologies? Variations of Naturalism in Social Philosophy” (project 100012_172992). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

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doi = "10.1080/13698230.2020.1853435",

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AU - Laitinen, Arto

AU - Särkelä, Arvi

N1 - Funding Information: We would like to thank Amy Allen, Matteo Bianchin, Åsa Burman, Federica Gregoratto, Säde Hormio, Katharine Jenkins, Joonas Pennanen, Corrado Piroddi, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments. We would also like to thank participants at the SPT conference, Brighton, “Critical Theory and The Concept of Social Pathology”, 13-14.9.2017; at the Social Ontology 2018 conference at Tufts, August 22-25, 2018, and at the Power & Governance conference at University of Tampere, 27-29 August 2018. This article is part of the Swiss National Science Foundation funded research project “A Diagnosis of Social Pathologies? Variations of Naturalism in Social Philosophy” (project 100012_172992). Publisher Copyright: © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - In this paper we elucidate the notion of ‘social wrongs’. It differs from moral wrongness, and is broader than narrowly political wrongs. We distinguish conceptually monadic wrongness (1.1), dyadic wronging (1.2), and the idea of there being something ‘wrong with’ an entity (1.3). We argue that social and political wrongs share a feature with natural badness or wrongness (illnesses of organisms) as well as malfunctioning artifacts or dysfunctional organizations: they violate so called ought-to-be norms; they are not as they ought to be; there is something wrong with them. In contrast, moral wrongs are violations of ought-to-do norms. Social wrongs typically, but not invariably, include dyadic wronging. We examine who or what can wrong whom or what, and by what means: we can be wronged by individuals and groups, as well as by practices, institutions or structures (2.1–2.3). The notion of structural injustice is compared to the notion of social wrongs in 2.4. Social wrongs are defined as there being something wrong with the social reality (3.3), in comparison to there being something wrong with an organism or a system (3.1), including the narrowly political wrongs of systems of governance (3.2).

AB - In this paper we elucidate the notion of ‘social wrongs’. It differs from moral wrongness, and is broader than narrowly political wrongs. We distinguish conceptually monadic wrongness (1.1), dyadic wronging (1.2), and the idea of there being something ‘wrong with’ an entity (1.3). We argue that social and political wrongs share a feature with natural badness or wrongness (illnesses of organisms) as well as malfunctioning artifacts or dysfunctional organizations: they violate so called ought-to-be norms; they are not as they ought to be; there is something wrong with them. In contrast, moral wrongs are violations of ought-to-do norms. Social wrongs typically, but not invariably, include dyadic wronging. We examine who or what can wrong whom or what, and by what means: we can be wronged by individuals and groups, as well as by practices, institutions or structures (2.1–2.3). The notion of structural injustice is compared to the notion of social wrongs in 2.4. Social wrongs are defined as there being something wrong with the social reality (3.3), in comparison to there being something wrong with an organism or a system (3.1), including the narrowly political wrongs of systems of governance (3.2).

KW - ought-to-be

KW - social pathology

KW - structural injustice

KW - wronging

KW - Wrongness

U2 - 10.1080/13698230.2020.1853435

DO - 10.1080/13698230.2020.1853435

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85096567530

SN - 1369-8230

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JO - CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

JF - CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

IS - 7

ER -

Social wrongs

Abstrakti

Rahoitus

Julkaisufoorumi-taso

!!ASJC Scopus subject areas

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